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    <title>Security on Bitsy Services Wiki</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Security on Bitsy Services Wiki</description>
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      <title>Secret Management with pass</title>
      <link>https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/pass/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/pass/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;code&gt;pass&lt;/code&gt; (&lt;a href=&#34;https://www.passwordstore.org/&#34;&gt;passwordstore.org&lt;/a&gt;) is a thin shell wrapper over &lt;a href=&#34;https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/gpg&#34;&gt;GPG&lt;/a&gt; and git. It is built for exactly the problem of secrets scattered across &lt;code&gt;.env&lt;/code&gt; files, exported private keys, and API tokens pasted into notes: it pulls them into one encrypted, versioned, greppable tree on disk.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This guide covers one-time setup (including the WSL Ubuntu wrinkles), the daily workflow, migrating your existing secrets in, scripting against the store, and the &lt;a href=&#34;https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/yubikey&#34;&gt;YubiKey&lt;/a&gt; hardening path. It assumes you are comfortable on the command line.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>GPG (GnuPG)</title>
      <link>https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/gpg/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/gpg/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;GnuPG&lt;/strong&gt; (GPG) is the free, complete implementation of the OpenPGP standard. It provides public-key encryption and digital signatures from the command line, and it is the encryption engine underneath &lt;a href=&#34;https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/pass&#34;&gt;&lt;code&gt;pass&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/a&gt;: every secret in a password store is an individual file encrypted to your GPG public key, decryptable only with the matching private key.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The model is asymmetric. A &lt;strong&gt;key pair&lt;/strong&gt; has a public half (used to encrypt &lt;em&gt;to&lt;/em&gt; you, safe to share) and a private half (used to decrypt, guarded by a passphrase and never shared). A modern GPG identity is usually a primary key plus subkeys for signing, encryption, and authentication &amp;ndash; which is what lets the private key be moved onto hardware like a &lt;a href=&#34;https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/yubikey&#34;&gt;YubiKey&lt;/a&gt; one subkey at a time.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>YubiKey</title>
      <link>https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/yubikey/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/yubikey/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;A &lt;strong&gt;YubiKey&lt;/strong&gt; is a small USB (and NFC) hardware authenticator made by Yubico. Among several applets it implements an &lt;strong&gt;OpenPGP smartcard&lt;/strong&gt;, which can hold &lt;a href=&#34;https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/gpg&#34;&gt;GPG&lt;/a&gt; private keys on the device itself. Once a key is moved onto the card, the private material never exists on disk and never leaves the hardware &amp;ndash; cryptographic operations happen &lt;em&gt;on&lt;/em&gt; the YubiKey, and the host only sends in ciphertext and gets back plaintext.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;This makes it the natural hardening step for a &lt;a href=&#34;https://wiki.bitsy.services/wiki/security/pass&#34;&gt;&lt;code&gt;pass&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/a&gt; store: the GPG key that can decrypt every secret stops being a file an attacker can copy and becomes a physical object you hold. With a touch policy enabled, each decryption also requires a deliberate tap, so malware cannot silently drain the store even while the key is plugged in.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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